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This paper examines the relations of trust in agricultural cooperation from two aspects. 
On the one hand, it gives a short review of relevant literature, with special regard to agri-
food economy. On the other hand, it uses the results of empirical survey for the analysis 
of trust in machinery sharing arrangements of Hungarian agricultural producers. In 
connection with this, the trust is examined in two dimensions: contractual and 
competence trust. Our results prove that there is a positive correlation between the level 
of trust and the farmers’ activity in cooperative agreements. It could also be proved that 
the trust need is very different in the different fields of cooperation. It is a tendency that 
the contractual trust is more important in more intensive, higher-dependence cooperation 
activities, while competence trust becomes into the foreground in the more extensive 
solutions.  
 
1. Introduction: background, motivation and aim  
The positive economic impacts of cooperation between farmers in many areas of 
agricultural production – with special regard to machinery use – have been examined by 
researchers both in Europe (see e.g. Larsen, 2008) and in the United States (e.g. Long and 
Kenkel, 2007). The above researchers point out that the partnership of farmers might 
have a major role in improving the profitability of farms and reducing the costs of 
production. In this sense, the cooperation of farmers in the agricultural economies of 
countries with structural and efficiency problems can be especially important in the 
achievement of goals of sustainable agriculture.  
In the 1990s, there were some trials in Hungary (too) to introduce the capital-efficient 
machine operation arrangements and partnerships (e.g. machinery ring), but these were 
not as successful as it was hoped by the professionals at that time. The empirical research 
on the subject points out that the reason for failure is the low cooperation willingness of 
farmers (Takács et al., 2006; EUROLAN, 2005). The negative experiences have 
motivated the present research, too.  
The cooperation willingness of farmers, as the basic condition of efficient organization 
and operation of communities based on human cooperation, has already been examined 
by a lot of researchers. The key role of trust factor has been clearly proved (see Section 2 
and 3). The main objective of the present research is to examine the role of trust – in this 
regard - in machinery sharing arrangements.  
The structure of the paper is organised as follows: after introduction, the second section 
briefly reviews the relevant current literature regarding trust with special emphasis on the 
agri-food economy. In section three role of trust in Hungarian agricultural co-operation is 
introduced including the review of some empirical studies. Section four presents model, 
data and results of an empirical research on machinery-sharing arrangements in Hungary. 
Finally, we draw conclusions with implications for further research. 
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 2. Different approaches to trust
1 with special emphasis on the agri-food economy 
Trust is very important in human relations, thus it is very significant in the cooperation 
among farmers, too. Questions of trust – as research topic – have become into the focus 
of interest in many scientific fields during the recent decades.  
Trust as a subject of study in (agricultural) economics is a relatively new phenomenon in 
spite of the fact that it has been used widely in sociology, anthropology and other “soft” 
disciplines. However, in the last 25 years the number of publications on trust in the 
economics literature has grown vastly. Some of them contain one or more definitions of 
trust or some classifications of categories related to the term. Here only some very 
important references will be made. 
To be able to understand the development of trust in co-operatives and possible ways to 
influence it, different authors (e.g. McAllister, 1995, Wilson, 2000; Borgen, 2001; 
Hansen et al., 2002; Szabó, 2010 etc.) classify many types of trust (e.g. cognitive and 
affective types etc.) as well as different levels of trust in co-operative organizations (e.g. 
between two members, among multiple members in general, as well as between the 
members and management). 
One of the most cited paper is by McAllister (1995). The author identifies two main types 
of trust: affective and cognitive. The former is more subjective and emotional bonded, 
while the latter is mainly based on rational calculations and empirical evidence. Hansen 
et al. (2002) develop these categories further and also use a process based approach. They 
also distinguish two types of trust: among members and also between members and the 
management. 
Wilson (2000) classifies different trust hierarchies (Wilson, 2000: 5), as well as giving an 
overview and critique of social capital and trust, including references to agribusiness 
economics. He also examines the changing types of trust in business relationships (trust 
mix) over time and states that weak trust can be changed into semi-strong trust or later 
even into strong trust. He also argues that trust which alters the terms of trade can reduce 
transaction costs and create additional (time) resource and flexibility for the management. 
Based on a large volume of (agricultural economics) literature, Sodano states “…that 
trust is essential to guarantee the success of cooperative relationship.” (Sodano, 2002: 
104) Referring to the existing literature, she also emphasizes “…the role of trust in 
facilitating vertical contractual relationship as well as horizontal coordination in the 
agricultural sector through grower associations and cooperatives” (Sodano, 2002: 105). In 
searching for a “workable” definition of trust, Sodano presents two main types of trust: 
1. Trust as a form of social organization (impersonal trust), and 
2. Trust as an exchange coordinating means or governance structure (interpersonal trust). 
Contrary to Williamson (1993), she thinks that the connection between trust and 
transaction cost economics is more complementary rather than alternative in approaching 
to organizational problems. She also examines the role of trust and vertical coordination 
in the food system. By reviewing the literature she states: 
“1. Networks, and primarily strategic alliances seem to be the best organizational firm’s 
response to new challenges … 
2. Trust is a basic asset required to build stable and effective networks. 
                                                 
1 Trust can be viewed as part of social capital (Szabó et al., 2005; Tömpe, 2008; Coleman, 1990) etc.) 
which is even larger context and it can be used for a more complex approach to rural and family enterprise 
development. 
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 3. The kind of trust with the highest effectiveness (“productivity”) in promoting networks 
is the less rational one …. 
4. Supply chain management through inter-organizational network is generally expected 
to enhance total system efficiency and welfare” (Sodano, 2002: 109). 
Bakucs et al. (2008) give a theoretical background of trust in agricultural co-operatives, 
including references for more detailed reviews. Fairbairn (2008) in searching for the co-
operative advantage and questioning whether co-operatives should have social goals as 
well, apart from economic ones, states: “To realize the importance of trust and social 
capital to co-operatives – the importance of culture – is to some extent to return to the 
roots of co-operation (Fairbairn, 2008: 207). Török and Hanf (2009) also argues that 
“trust plays an important role for farmers to join a marketing cooperative in transition 
countries” (Török and Hanf, 2009: 1). 
 
3. Role of trust in agricultural co-operation: selected empirical studies from 
Hungary 
Regarding transition economies, theoretically marketing co-operatives may solve many 
problems of transaction related problems via horizontal and/or vertical coordination. 
However, the number of co-operatives is still limited in transition countries like Hungary, 
although  “…trust plays an important role for farmers to join a marketing cooperative in a 
transition country” (Bakucs et al., 2007, 2008). One possible explanation for this 
phenomenon is the lack of trust and willingness to co-operate among producers, as well 
as between farmers and their business partners (Bakucs et al., 2008). Analysing the most 
important causes to join a co-operative, Bakucs et al. find „…that the quantity, the 
existence of contract, flexibility and trust are the most important factors for farmers to 
selling their product via cooperative” (Bakucs et al., 2007: 15). 
Bakucs et al. (2008) investigated the impacts of trust among the members, as well as 
between the members and the management in the case of Hungarian Mórakert co-
operative. According to the authors’ knowledge, this paper was the first to systematically 
investigate different types of trust among members of a marketing co-operative and 
between members and management of a co-operative in a transition country. They 
focused on the effect of trust on co-operative membership performance, satisfaction and 
their commitment to remain a part (member) of the co-operative according to the 
hypotheses and findings of Hansen et al. (2002), which analyze the role of trust in 
cooperative performance. 
The results by Bakucs et al. (2008) suggest that trust among co-operative members and 
trust between member and management have positive effects on group cohesion. They 
also find, as did Hansen et al. (2002), that affective trust has a greater impact on group 
cohesion than cognitive trust on both levels. In addition, trust among members has a 
greater impact on group cohesion and members’ satisfaction than trust between members 
and the management (Bakucs et al., 2007). 
Dudás (2009), analyzing the co-operative’s role in coordinating fruit and vegetable 
producers, deals with trust issues as well. His survey was based on a questionnaire used 
by Bakucs et al. (2007, 2008). Dudás summarizes his empirical results regarding the 
impact of trust on co-operative members’ group cohesion, performance and satisfaction 
(emphasis in original) as follows: “Producers’ low willingness to cooperate is possibly 
due to lack of trust. In a questionnaire survey I proved that at ZÖLD-TERMÉK 
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 Cooperative trust has a decisive impact in the development of group cohesion. More 
precisely, affective trust has a greater impact on group cohesion than cognitive trust. I 
have found that group cohesion has a positive impact on members’ performance and 
satisfaction. Furthermore, it is again affective trust that has a greater impact on members’ 
performance and satisfaction, not cognitive trust. The greater effect of affective trust 
implies that the emotional foundations of an association and cooperation are stronger than 
tangible economic results. A PO (Producers’ Organization, authors) management may 
improve the cohesion within the cooperative by increasing its own trustworthiness and 
strengthening personal contacts (both among members and between members and 
management). This way its members would be satisfied and stay cooperative members” 
Dudás (2009: 21).  
Forgács (2006) examined two Hungarian agricultural co-operatives as case studies based 
on interviews. “Field work was carried out in a traditional cooperative, BÉKE, and in a 
newly-established Purchasing and Marketing Cooperative, HAJDÚ GAZDÁK 
(PMCHG)” (Forgács, 2006: 23). The most important findings of the study regarding trust 
and opportunism are the following: “Members in both co-ops regarded trust and 
reciprocity as important elements of social capital. However, their approach to the issue 
reflects different standpoints. Trust towards formal institutions differed in the two co-ops. 
Members of PMCHG had low levels of trust in current government officials and EU 
institutions. In contrast, BÉKE members had more trust in national government and their 
trust in EU institutions was also above average. However, where trust levels in state 
institutions were low, to reduce transaction costs people looked for informal institutions 
to solve their problems” (Forgács, 2006: 32).  
It is also very interesting that the study applies a macro-level approach in connection to a 
micro-level one. It is remarkable how farmers trust in their own organization in order to 
solve their (marketing) problems (such as lowering transaction costs) instead of relying 
on governmental and/or EU institutions. Forgács (2006) also states: “In the two 
cooperatives the role of leadership differed somewhat. In the BÉKE” Co-op, the 
management’s goal was to avoid breaking up the cooperative community, while at 
PMCHG the key players’ central responsibility was to persuade individual farmers to 
begin and solidify cooperation in order to build up a new cooperative community.  In 
both co-ops the trust placed in management indicated that leadership plays an important 
role in cooperatives” (Forgács, 2006: 35).    
 
4. Empirical research on machinery-sharing arrangements in Hungary 
4.1. Theoretical basis for the empirical model 
We used the Sholtes trust model as a basis in our research. Sholtes (1998) placed trust in 
the matrix of loyalty and capability. If the belief in loyalty as well as in capability is high 
among the partners, then we can speak about trust (Figure 1).  
The basic model was adapted with slight modifications. Out of the several trust-
definitions in the special literature we approved the approach of Sako (1992), according 
to which we can speak about trust when one of the business partners expects the other to 
act rationally and in a mutually acceptable way. When discussing the types of trust Sako 
distinguished – among others – the contractual trust and the competence trust. (1) 
Contractual trust: it is based on the mutually accepted standard of honesty and keeping 
the promises; when one of the contracting parties presumes that the other party keeps his 
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 words; (2) Competence trust: when the business partner presumes that the other party 
possesses the necessary technical and management competence to fulfill the committed 
tasks. These two types of trust were transferred into the Sholtes model. 
   Capability 
“The value I consider my 
partner is capable and qualified” 
    
   Low  High 
High SYMPATHY  TRUST  Loyalty 
“The value I believe my partner likes me 
and he will support me in future”  Low MISTRUST RESPECT 
Source: based on Sholtes (1998)  
Figure 1: Level of trust among business partners on the basis of loyalty to each other and 
the presumed capability level 
The selection of the above trust types was made on the basis of experiences of former 
empirical research projects (Takács et al., 2006).  
 
4.2. Material and methods 
Data 
Our examinations are based on primary databases. In order to explore the correlations 
between trust and willingness to cooperate in machinery sharing arrangements we have 
performed questionnaire survey in the South-Eastern part of Hungary, in the Southern 
Great Plain region, in Békés county. The research involved the private farmers of three 
statistical micro regions, namely Orosháza, Békéscsaba and Mezőkovácsháza. The survey 
was made between November 2008 and October 2009 and reviewed the economic year of 




Definition of areas of machinery sharing arrangements, measurement models 
Cooperation, as an expression is a wide concept – even considering machine use – and it 
can be implemented in a lot of forms. During the research – based on former research 
experiences – we have examined the farmers’ activity in three areas of machinery 
sharing:  
(1) Machinery services based on mutuality (COOP_1): In our approach this solution is 
the most extensive form of cooperation. In this case the farmer performs work with own 
machinery for fellow farmers on mutual basis. The respondents quantified the activity in 
the questionnaire by evaluating each work process on a scale from one to four. Utilizing 
this information, the following equation was set up to express the value of activity rate: 
                                                 
2 It is important to note that in statistical terms we do not regard the sample representative either at national 
or county level, but on the basis of local-level representativeness of the sample we presume that the results 
collected from the examined region can be generalized because the region is not much different from the 









1 _   i= 1, 2, 3 … n (1.) 
where: vi = frequency of cooperation connected with work process No. i [range 0-3: 0- 
never; 1- rarely: 1-2 times a year; 2- medium: 3-4 times a year; 3- frequent: more than 5 
times a year]; n = number of work processes [pcs].  
(2) Mutual exchange of machinery (COOP_2): this solution means a machinery sharing 
arrangement where the farmer lends his own asset to his fellow farmer. According to the 








2 _   i= 1, 2, 3 … n (2.) 
where: vi = the participation activity of agricultural machinery No. i in cooperation [range 
0-3: 0- never; 1- rarely: 1-2 times/year; 2- medium: 3-4 times/year; 3- frequent: more 
than 5 times/year]; n = number of machinery [pcs].  
(3) Joint ownership and use of machinery (COOP_3): it is the most intensive form of 
joint machine use, where the farmers carry out a joint investment and share the acquired 








3 _   i= 1, 2, 3 … n (3.) 
where: vi = joint ownership of No. i agricultural machinery of the farm [0, 1 dichotomic 
variables: 0-no, 1-yes]; n = number of machinery [pcs].  
Considering the three types of cooperation activity in narrow sense we developed an 
aggregated willingness-to-cooperate rate (WTC-rate) which describes the total 
cooperation activity of the observation units. We needed objective weights for correct 
and precise definition of indices. These weights should be rendered to the different areas 
of cooperation, thus expressing the different intensity of individual cooperation 
arrangements. The principal component analysis (PCA) helped us in the solution of the 
problem. We used the principal component weights in the so-called A matrix made by 
multivariate statistical method. According to this, the aggregated index was determined 
as follows: 
3 _ 2 _ 1 _




A COOP A COOP A COOP
rate WTC
+ +
⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅
= −  (4.) 
where:  WTC-rate  = aggregated index of cooperation activity in case of the given 
observation unit [-]; COOP_x = the value of activity rates that are typical in the 
individual areas of machinery sharing arrangements [-]; ACOOP_x = the linear correlation 
coefficient of cooperation arrangements with principal component (A matrix of PC-1) [-]. 
 
Measuring of trust 
In order to examine the farmers’ trust we collected information on the basis trust concepts 
detailed above (see section 4.1). Two questions were used for measuring the level of 
contractual trust and three questions for competence trust (Questions used for measuring 
the trust level: (1) Contractual trust: I think my fellow farmers definitely keep their 
words; I think my fellows would never do any harm to me if the conditions of farming 
7 
 changed. (2) Competence trust: I trust that if any of my fellow farmers provides any 
machine work to me, the quality of his work will be the best possible under the given 
conditions; I trust that if any of my fellow farmers provides any machine work to me, it 
will be done at the most appropriate time, under the given conditions; I trust that if I lend 
a machine or tool to any of my fellow farmers, he will use it with the due precautions). 
The respondents evaluated the replies on a scale from 1 to 7, where the opinions were 
expressed according to the following: 1= „I do not agree at all”, 7= „I agree maximally”. 
The expression of each level of trust was made with a simple arithmetical calculation of 
average.  
The validity of Sholtes model was tested (see Section 4.1) with ANOVA model and the 
belonging post-hoc tests (based on Levene-test: Scheffe- and LSD-test). We have also 
used regression statistical models (linear and binominal logistic regression).  
 
Hypotheses 
Considering the theoretical basis we have examined the role of contractual trust and 
competence trust in joint machinery sharing arrangements. Two hypotheses were drafted 
in connection with Sholtes model: 
Hypothesis 1 (H1): Machinery sharing arrangement will be the most typical in case of 
high-level contractual and competence trust.  
Hypothesis 2 (H2): Considering the examined areas of cooperation, the role of 
competence trust is determinant in the more extensive forms of cooperation, while 
contractual trust is required for the more intensive solutions.  
 
4.3. Empirical results 
Testing of the Sholtes model 
We divided the contractual and competence trust scales into 3 parts each: 1-2 degrees = 
meant low levels; 3-5 degrees= medium; and 6-7 degrees= meant high levels
3. 
Comparing the two dimensions, the average activity rate (WTC-rate) values are 
summarized in Table 1. The methods of descriptive statistics prove that the presumption 
based on Sholtes model was correct because low trust levels were paired with lower 
average activity rates, while the higher levels attracted higher activity rates. As regards 
the other trust level combinations the values were calculated between the two extreme 
values.  
We have made control examinations for validating the results. One-way ANOVA model 
complemented with post-hoc tests was used for comparing the cell average. The results 
proved that there are significant differences between the cooperation activities of groups 
of perfect distrust (group 1) and unconditional trust (group 8) – using the titles from the 
original models. It is interesting, however, that the expected value of activity rate in 
group 3, which represents the respect towards fellow farmers, does not differ significantly 
from any of the averages of other groups. None of the farmers belong to the category of 
pure sympathy, no such combination could be identified in the examined sample. The 
                                                 
3 The determination of categories was preceded by a histogram examination, that proved the reasonability 
of formed degrees through the „peaks” of frequencies. 
8 
 experiences collected in the groups of “trust with reservations” that is medium trust level 
point out that the trust approach based on Sholtes model cannot give perfect and exact 
explanation for the cooperation activity of farms either. The validation of the model, 
however, can be considered successful. The final conclusion is that H1 hypothesis could 
be proved only partly.  
 
Table 1: The average values of cooperation activity rates (WTC-rates) in each dimension 
of trust 
Degree of trust in Capability 
Dimensions of trust 











































Source: own calculation 
 
On the basis of the results it can be stated that both the contractual and the competence 
trust have important roles in machinery sharing arrangements although the model also 
underlines that the weight and importance of trust types is not equal
4, and this fact 
motivates further examinations.   
 
Contractual trust versus competence trust 
In further parts of our work we used regression models for analysing the role of 
individual trust types in different cooperation agreements. The main results of our 
examination are summarized in Table 2.  
The aggregated cooperation willingness values (WTC-rate) were significantly determined 
by both the contractual and competence trust levels in the multivariate linear regression 
model. As regards the force of explanatory variables, the competence trust has much 
greater impact than the level of loyalty trust. It has proved our previous statements. The 
direction of the impact – as it has been expected – is positive. The two explanatory 
variables together could explain 13.5% of WTC-rate dispersion.  
The activity values in machinery services based on mutuality (COOP_1) were determined 
only by the trust in the competence of the fellow farmer – according to the statistics. The 
                                                 
4  The aggregated average values of the categories of the two trust dimensions prove that the individual 
trust types affect the cooperation willingness differently. In case of contractual trust 0.99 belongs to the 
lowest trust level and 1.71 to the highest one, while in case of competence trust these values are between 
0.39 and 1.72. The slope of the average cooperation activity curves is different. (The average slope 
determined with the simplest estimation procedure – according to ∆y/∆x correlation – is 0.24 in the whole x 
definition range in case of contractual trust, while it is 0.44 in case of competence trust.)  
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 trust in loyalty shows great independence from this. All these prove that this solution is 
the “most extensive” form of machine use cooperation, where the most important factor 
is the belief in the partner’s capability to fulfill his undertaken tasks.  
 
Table 2: Effect of contractual (LOY_TR) and competence trust (CAP_TR) on 
cooperation willingness (summarizing table of results of regression analysis) 
Dependent variables 
WTC-rate COOP_1 COOP_2  COOP_3 
R
2= 0.135  R
2= 0.093  R




B Sig. B Sig. B Sig. B Sig. 
LOY_TR [-]  0.170 0.046 0.000 0.997 0.241 0.037 0.168 0.310 
CAP_TR [-]  0.304 0.000 0.327 0.000 0.181 0.006 0.456 0.045 
Source: own calculation  (n= 132) 
 
The multivariate model analyzing the machine lending cooperation (COOP_2) shows 
interesting results. Both explanatory variables have become significant model elements, 
although value B indicates that the level of loyalty trust has greater impact and gives 
better explanation to machine lending activity than competence trust. Although the 
difference in explanatory force is slight, but confirmed. The two variables together in the 
model explains only 10% of the heterogeneity of cooperation activity.  
The correlations between machinery sharing (COOP_3) and the discussed trust 
dimensions are examined in the frames of binominal logistics regression
5. Analyzing the 
individual impact of variables it is obvious that only the impact of competence trust can 
be regarded significant before entering the model, the loyalty trust is not significant. It 
partly contradicts to preliminary expectations, because it was presumed that the role of 
contractual trust would become determinant at the highest level of cooperation. In total 
the model – following its construction – is significant and can explain 11.3% of the total 
dispersion, according to Nagelkerke R
2. Following the involvement of trust variables in 
the model, the competence trust has kept its significance, so the given variable essentially 
contributed to the model. On the basis of this we can conclude that the joint machine 
ownership, as form of cooperation is based mostly on competence trust, although the 
loyalty trust also has some not negligible – although statistically only partly confirmed – 
role. Hypothesis 2 could be confirmed only partly due to the above revealed interrelation.  
 
5. Conclusions 
The results of – non-representative – empirical research made in agricultural enterprises 
of Békés county indicate that farmers in the new situation following the social transition 
gave wrong answers – in the long run - to the occurring problems. It was a general 
phenomenon that the social ties were broken due to the difficult economic and social 
conditions and it led to massive distrust. Distrust has also emerged in the relations 
                                                 
5 There were only 12 farms in the whole sample which used this form of cooperation, and only 2 farms 
could claim that they have more than one machinery in joint ownership, thus the linear model could not be 
used for exploring the correlation. COOP_3 variable was transformed into dichotomous variable, value 0 
was given to those farms where this form of cooperation was not used and value 1 was given to those 
where it was used.  
10 
 between farmers and induced the worst possible replies to the occurring problems. When 
looking for solutions, the farmers were motivated for independence instead of 
cooperation and it has made the difficult situation even worse. This phenomenon can be 
traced even today, the level of trust is still very low. It is a positive sign, however, that a 
young generation of farmers have emerged – free from the real or presumed injuries of 
the pre-transitional period - and they have higher trust levels and are more open to 
cooperation, to the ideas of joining forces and economic advantages.  
The above mentioned empirical results cannot be generalized since they are only case 
studies and all cases have geographical and commodity limitations as well. Thus, further 
research is needed to clarify the role of trust in the success or failure of agricultural co-
operation in Hungary and other transition countries. 
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